Heed Their Rising Voices Advertisement Sample Assignment

In the newspaper advertising, Heed Their Rising Voices, the authors write about peaceful protests of Black people for their rights and against discrimination. “Again and again, the Southern violators have answered Dr. King peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his home, almost killing his wife and child. They have arrested him seven times…” (“Heed Their Rising Voices,” 1960). With such words, the authors transfer the main idea of the advertising: the rage about the injustice and inequality widespread in those times. The aim of it is to hear, to “heed the voices” of those who suffer from that and urge for help from those who cannot tolerate injustice too.

I am impressed and enraged with those facts: it is why this advertising has caught me. It describes the actions of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a famous human rights defender. He was the advocate of non-violent protests to defend the rights, especially the rights of the Black people. Among the American cities, “Tallahassee, Atlanta, Nashville, Savannah, Greensboro, Memphis, Richmond, and a host of other cities in the South,” teenagers came out to protest against the discrimination (“Heed Their Rising Voices,” 1960). They were not afraid to oppose the government and police forces and other people who were not tolerant. Protesters are described as heroes suffering from those who are against the democratic reforms. The article is advertising and was written to encourage people to donate money: thus, the article may be quite overweighted. Still, the courage and willingness of those people to defend human rights have impressed and inspired me. I think that those qualities are essential in a democratic society, where all people should have equal rights and possibilities.


Heed their rising voices. (1960). New York Times.

Gladiators And Practitioners Experience Of Greek Style Athletics

Sports origin is deeply rooted in the rich history of Rome and ancient Greece. Olympic games in ancient Greek represent one of the oldest and most foundational types of sports recorded in history. Colosseum is a familiar battlefield where gladiators hosted several ferocious and suspenseful chariot races. Both the violence-driven Roman culture and the athletic Greek culture set the standards for different games and competitions that followed. Romans’ perspective on sports was different from that of Greeks as the latter were less violent because their competitions did not demand the death of any of the participants.

The Roman gladiators encouraged violence, while the Greece Olympians encouraged peace during their competitions. There were a treaty and people in charge of suspending war in Greek athletics competitions, prohibiting entry of armies to city Elis, and forbidding legal disputes and executions. The truce was tasked with the provision of safety to the spectators and athletes during the travel to the competitions (Edelman & Wilson, 2017). On the other hand, gladiator games were a highly violent kind of sport and entertainment. In the arenas where the competitions of gladiators were performed, there was the execution of prisoners, animal slaying, and fighting to the death (Matz, 2019). The death battles between gladiators showed a culture that celebrated violence as opposed to Greeks, who celebrated peaceful athletics competitions.

The two cultures attached different importance to religion as Greek athletics viewed it as more important compared to Roman gladiators. Greeks associated their competitions with a celebration of their god, Zeus. 100 oxen were sacrificed during Greek athletics competitions on the middle days of the competitions for Zeus (Matz, 2019). Greeks considered their Olympics as blessed by Zeus and always praised him for their victories. Equally, Roman’s gladiatorial experiences were established as a religious practice; however, this changed as the games lost religious context. Although some people joined at will, the Roman gladiators involved prisoners of war and slaves who were forced to participate in deadly battles against their wish. Religion did not have great importance to Romans, and all praise was directed to their emperor.

Both Roman gladiators and Greek athletes had significant cultural implications. Both competitions stirred the action of authors as well as poets to record various events through writing (Edelman & Wilson, 2017). Additionally, the two games encouraged the advancement of architecture, mathematics, and statuette due to the demand for stadiums and statues to host and praise the events. The Greek athletic competitions promoted celebrations of wealth, athletic abilities, and religion. Conversely, gladiatorial games were often planned and organized by influential people to entertain citizens at the expense of bloodshed and other peoples’ lives (Edelman & Wilson, 2017). In gladiatorial events, the wealthy used the platform to flaunt their riches in favor of violence, while Greek Olympics promoted peaceful actions.

The two events involved commercialization and enjoyment of a certain social class in society. Victory athletes were celebrated as winners and regarded as blessed and favored by Zeus in Greece society (Edelman & Wilson, 2017). Conversely, despite being a slave, a gladiator was assigned a higher prestige compared to other people. Many people would volunteer to become gladiators to acquire fame and riches (Edelman & Wilson, 2017). Both cultures praise the winners in the competitions showing the value they attached to the sport. Greek Olympics attracted many spectators contributing to revenue during the games. Conversely, commercialization for gladiators was evident in their promotion of violent cultural events during peaceful times.

Romans’ perspective on sports clashed with that of Greeks as the latter encouraged peace in competitions. Roman gladiatorial events were organized with no regard for celebrating peaceful events as they involved execution and death battles. Gladiators did not consider religion as important compared to Greek athletics, who considered the competitions a blessing by Zeus. The two games influenced the advancement of mathematics and architecture due to the need to build stadiums and statues. Generally, Roman gladiators and Greek athletics competitions are the oldest foundational forms of competitions in history that share similarities and differences.


Edelman, R., & Wilson, W. (2017). The Oxford handbook of sports history. Oxford University Press.

Matz, D. (2019). Ancient Roman sports, Az: Athletes, venues, events and terms. McFarland.

World War II: Maskirovka Military Deception And Denials Operations


This paper investigates the impact of maskirovka military deception and denials operations, a component of information warfare. The case study is set during World War II, specifically during the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942.The paper analyses the critiques of deception enhanced at this particular period. In this case, we used authentic materials to confirm the existence of maskirovka and assess the cohesion of military deception operations based on descriptions of their level of success. Our findings indicate that while maskirovka aided development and behavior, it substantially impacted Russian wars. As the several battles that Russia participated in, they won due to their strategic measures of deception. Hence, the paper assesses that deceitfulness was a key victory strategy in warfare. Past and future operations are also analyzed to confirm the act of craftiness on the battlefield.


The paper demonstrates that when it comes to a foreign policy against Russia, it is critical to contemplate advancements in technology concerning innovations and for traditional military applications and uses that are not yet at the threshold of war. Much has been written about the role of information and communications technologies, such as cyber and other new technologies, in the context of Russian military gains. Russia’s weaponization of information has also resulted in a large amount of writing. A missing link in the effectiveness of Russian military deception operations is the importance of maskirovka, the article intended to fill in the blanks to ascertain certain events’ occurrence. Information warfare can undermine the legitimacy of targeted governments while also providing the initiator with more options for achieving their objectives. These capabilities are mentioned in the Russian doctrinal description of information warfare below. As to respond successfully to a confrontation or conflict, decision-makers must have an accurate perspective.

Strategic Deception

Deception is applied in defense to hide the accurate locations of our forces in the field and misguide the enemy. By hiding their actual place, the armed forces reduce losses. The strategy causes the enemy to expend intelligence and firepower efforts enormously. The misguiding of the enemies can cause them to attack or deploy unwisely. The primary aim is to control decision-maker perceptions notified as an automatic directive. There is hope to add a policy-relevant perspective to the literature on Russian information warfare through maskirovka and military deception operations.

The research will also analyze the past and future operational potential of maskirovka. Strategic deception and denial have been playing an implicit role in the governing of the armed forces. Throughout the past, the majority of disputes have revealed at least inferred solicitation of military duplicity at the scheme, operational, and planned levels. In the current society, definite approaches to enhance military deceptions stand at the center of most advanced military concepts. War has been marked out as the perpetual path of trickery. Currently, in a global of ponderously doused worldwide process and uneven from social networking and immediate communication networking to worldwide specification and competing, the vet nature of armed warfare has diverted into the principality of disruptive sociopolitics and purported public judgments. Hence the spirit of deception has also changed along with it.

Russian military deception operations and non-military tactics are currently being used to compete in the grey zone with the West. Grey zone activities are coercive and hostile but intended to remain below the threshold of conventional military combat and open interstate warfare. Russia can pursue goals typically achieved through armed conflict while avoiding the costs of war by manipulating information. Data has become a destructive weapon like a projectile, bayonet, or bullet. The effective use of this weapon enables gradual rather than violent changes to the status.

A falsehood is built on a small amount of truth which serves as the foundation for transforming a scenario into a fictitious reality that appears credible to a target audience. In an ideal world, this fictional reality would pervade the target group’s perception, causing people to make decisions that advance the designer’s goals rather than their own. Interconnected tactical, operational, and strategic levels must be coordinated for the false reality to remain plausible. Coordination necessitates the centralization of communication and decision-making. Although information technologies have made continuous communication more accessible, centralization has always taken precedence and will undoubtedly continue to do so in the future.

The most fundamental principle in operational planning was adhered to unwaveringly in all operations on all fronts. Like the 2014 takeover of Crimea, centralization enabled efficient military deception operations success of these activities is due to effective leadership, which concentrated control of the entire essential political, economic, financial, military, intelligence, and information tools. Despite changes in personal leadership, government form, operational setting, and available technologies in the seventy years since these conflicts, centralization has remained a fundamental deception feature. The 4D strategy, used in non-military disinformation efforts, attempts to discard, mislead, distract, and dismay people. It is the result of intuitive control of measures used in strategizing.

After 1991, Giles identifies three critical developmental stages in gaining the ability to pursue this strategy correctly. The first phase began with the Second Chechen War in 1999. Despite the Russian dominance of traditional media, Chechens successfully used the internet to counter Russian propaganda. As a result, the Russian government began to regard the internet as a threat and a destabilizing factor, while its security agencies sought to exploit it. The 2008 Russo-Georgian War marked the start of the second developing phase. Although it is unclear whether Russia or Georgia won the information war, there was a clear contrast between Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili’s efficacies in speaking to target audiences in their language. Russian Deputy Chief of General Staff Anatoliy Nogovitsyn’s belated press conferences was held exclusively in Russian. As a result, plans for the formation of ‘Information Troops’ have been floated. Among them are hacker journalists, psychological operation specialists, strategic communications, and, most importantly, linguists.

However, the drive to create these forces came to a halt around 2011 or 2012. The events coincided with the start of the third phase and protests over Russia’s elections. Instead, several capabilities envisioned for Information Troops were realized by creating a ‘Kremlin troll army,’ which used human capabilities to influence online debate. Automated systems were also used, but they proved insufficient when used alone. The media element of Russian information campaigns exhibited close coordination of messaging with centralized direction and a fantastic diversity of alternative sources to cover all sectors of the target population. Even more extensive drives requiring agency coordination or posing a political risk to Russia can have humble beginnings either with a particular actor on the ground or by capitalizing on a spontaneous opportunity. As these develop, they require approval from higher up the chain of command. Descriptions on various sites help explain some viewers’ repeated contact with Russian propaganda from seemingly varied sources.

Many disjointed, sometimes contradictory, narratives and ideas influence the target group’s perception of reality. The level of centralization in the campaign’s conduct is likely to vary between Galeotti and Giles’ descriptions, depending on the circumstances and objectives of the movement. Due to lessons learned from previous conflicts and blunders, disinformation tactics continue to evolve. Based on recent misinformation campaign coordination mistakes. The ideologies demonstrate that Russian disinformation tactics will remain centralized in the future.


Specific deception operations were selected for the case study based on data availability or, in the case of World War II actions, to demonstrate the evolution of military deception capability. Due to the scarcity of primary documents discussing decision thresholds, various sources, including memoirs, internet interviews, and meeting minutes, were used. Among those who have commented on these materials are members of the Politburo and Russian special operations soldiers.

Second World War

During World War II, Russia developed military deception capabilities that influenced doctrine for decades to come. This evolution is divided into four stages. Throughout the initial phase, the Soviets tried a variety of deception strategies. These included moving troops at night or in unusual directions, impersonating false force concentrations, striking while marching, and conducting surveillance across the entire front. However, these methods effectively influence adversary behaviors due to inexperience and coordination. During the second phase, they formed functional groups among commanders of various armaments to plan and organize military deception operations, which improved coordination.

Based on the first phase’s experiences, the army was also taught effective deception techniques and organization using uniform directions. These new techniques enhanced their ability to deceive on multiple levels. These modifications assisted the Soviets in concealing their rear from the Germans, allowing them to transfer units up to the front without being detected by German intelligence. In the third phase, the Soviets launched a strategic offensive. The use of the new methodology increased the possibility of deception. Each was made to fit the terrain and weather conditions. Front commanders could reorganize armies at their leisure—military deception orders issued after 1943 encouraged commanders to be creative and agile to avoid predictability.

In the fourth phase, the Soviets launched their final offensive against the Germans along a pre-planned front. Because of the smaller geographical area, troop concentrations were higher, limiting the possibility of deception. The Soviets focused their efforts on keeping the scope of the attack a secret from the Germans. They maintained concealment while reorganizing and shifting forces between fronts and from reserve to front. German intelligence missed between fifty and hundred percent of the reunited troops in almost every case. Successful military deception operations contributed to Germany’s strategic disaster during this final stage. The Soviet military and academic communities conducted extensive research on military deception during and after the war. Centralization was a recurring theme.

The ability of lower-level units to comprehend the complex regulations and directives passed down to them was critical to the General Staff’s ability to conduct military deception operations. These rules have evolved as a result of tactical and operational experiences. The Soviet military’s ability to carry out coordinated deceptions on a centralized level improved as the military internalized these lessons. The operations examined in this case study represent each of the four stages of development. As a result, the first campaign studied, Rostov, took place during the first phase of development, the second campaign, Stalingrad, during the second phase. This release provides a detailed and concise overview of Soviet military deception efforts during World War II.

1942 Battle of Stalingrad

The battle of Stalingrad took the initiative between twenty-third august and second February in the year nineteen forty-two. It was influenced by both Germany and its allies who wanted soviet control of the city of Stalingrad, currently referred to as vulgar in southern Russia. This warfare was one of the deadliest conflicts to occur in the Second World War; it was also one of the bloodiest wars in the history of action as it led to the death of two million estimated individuals. The warfare marked a turning point in the war as it forced the German commander to recruit other armed forces to replace those who had subsided. The victory at the nineteen fort two battle led to shifting power in favor of the soviets, and it energized the red army.

In the battle of Stalingrad, the constructive appliance of army deceptions by the soviets reflected both Hitler and German field commanders that the red army could do less in the way when encountering enormous battles. In the run-up to the Soviet onslaught at Stalingrad in southern Russia, deception was used on numerous fronts. Representatives of the Stavka gave verbal orders for the offensive and accompanying deception measures to the commanders who would carry them out. Acts in the Moscow region prepared active offensive operations in preparation for this offensive during the summer and fall of 1942. Following this, defensive operations in Southern Russia began in mid-October 1942. A primary indicator of the disinformation element within maskirovka was an expansion in both undisguised and seemingly covert activity direct to Moscow as withdrawal of civilian this measures hauled Germans concerns away.

The orders for these defensive operations in Southern Russia were carefully crafted and widely disseminated. The primary goal of these operations was to persuade the Germans to launch a winter attack on the German Army Group Center, which was stationed north of Stalingrad. As a result of this diversion, the German forces at Stalingrad would be reduced. While German attention was diverted elsewhere, on October 25th, a directive was sent to Soviet commanders along the Don River and in the Southwestern Fronts, instructing them to implement the following deception measures. The troops were expected to march only at night and rest in concealment during the day, movements should be covered by aviation and anti-aircraft units, and loudspeakers should be used to mask engine noise. The soviets would create few tank armies without detection from the enemy through a significant reduction in radio traffic, restriction of movement at nightfall, and concealment of formations during the day.

Furthermore, bridges were constructed along the Don River, five false. The Germans successfully bombed the five false bridges, whereas false artillery and tank concentrations were also established. Military and Strategic Culture Deception on November 16th, the Soviets used smoke cover units to cross the river Don. To further confuse the Germans, some units moved in the opposite direction at this time. To the south of Stalingrad, sixteen thousand men with five hundred guns, four hundred and thirty tanks, and fourteen thousand trucks were transported across the river Volga entirely at night without alerting the enemy. Over a million men were transferred in all preparatory to functioning Uranus. This November nineteen forty-two assault saw the Sixth Army’s fate sealed by the decisive encirclement of three hundred thousand confederation forces in Stalingrad. Even though air reconnaissance notified then-General Friedrich Paulus of underlined intensity on the river Don, he did nothing, thanks to Soviet intelligence’s successful deception tactics within and beyond Stalingrad.

Thus, the general was entirely caught off guard, neglecting to either prepare his armor as a mobile reserve with fuel and ammo or to move it on the attack day. According to historian David Glantz, the Red Army’s most considerable feat was concealing the extent of the onslaught. As a result of the Soviet deception, twelve divisions were transferred to Army Group Center, reducing German resistance at Stalingrad. A German directive dated November 29th acknowledges the effective camouflage of Soviet units participating in the onslaught against Stalingrad. It continues by stating that the Soviets are capable of concealing offensive preparations. Because the Germans were confident that the Soviets lacked the workforce to attack Stalingrad, the Soviet victory was primarily about covering the magnitude of the onslaught.

Past and Future Operational Potential of Deception

Some rules had to be met for the deception campaign to be successful and for maskirovka to be used again and again. First, the deception had to be plausible to the enemy, and then it had to be planned and put into action at the highest level of government. During the Cold War, maskirovka was a strategy only for the military. Now, because of global powers’ subversive geopolitics, maskirovka can be used just as well (or even better) in times of relative calm. There have been a lot of cases of maskirovka inactivity, from the Eastern front to the Cuban Missile calamity and the invasion of Crimea. One of the best things about this comprehensive approach is that it can change to meet the situation’s needs.

Multidimensional doctrine is not just good for the military, it can help people in other fields as well. Instead, it is used both on the ground and in the public’s mind. Because of this, the regime’s long-term goal of making Russia more potent in Eastern Europe, or using maskirovka as a base in Syria, is now more likely than ever to come to pass. Military deception is a natural and vital part of the battle because it aims to surprise the enemy.

Moreover, maskirovka isn’t just about camouflaging and hiding people and things. It is about a lot more than that. Instead, maskirovka is about actively manipulating the enemy at all levels of the battlespace, both military and diplomatic. Deception techniques can make good strategic moves in conventional and asymmetric combat, as shown by how well they use a variety of battlespace elements.

The most significant thing to remember from this brief look at maskirovka is that its potential will outweigh the costs and make it more likely to work in practice if capable leaders use it well. However, if it is done wrong or inconsistently, the consequences could be terrible. The doctrine must be used to understand the battlespace and see how it works. This doctrine has changed because of the unique history of both Russia’s Soviet Union and the modern Russian Federation. The case in the West, where it would be complicated for this doctrine to change as quickly as it has in Russia. While the West may be good at changing strategic objectives to match their real goals on the ground, maskirovka’s multifaceted value comes from its ability to set up a new truth around which a hidden aim is built. According to a long-held view, war is another way to talk about politics. On the other hand, maskirovka thinks open and covert conflicts could have significant strategic and operational advantages.


By examining discourse and military deception operations from World War II, it is discovered that maskirovka likely aided in the conception and execution of cohesive military deception operations. Moreover, it influences information flow in Soviet and Russian political-military institutions. As a result, knowledge tends to move primarily from top to bottom in these organizations, with subordinates being more receptive to information from authorities. These culturally informed tendencies facilitate and promote the centralization required for military deception operations to be cohesive. The study shows that when considering foreign policy toward Russia, it is necessary to assess improvements in technology for advanced military use and innovations and application below the level of declared war, such as hybrid warfare or conflict below the line. Understanding the significance of maskirovka in military deception operations is a critical aspect of twenty-first-century geopolitics. This comprehensive doctrine of denial and deception in war must be deployed and applied to fit specific issues and opportunities experienced in the 21st century.


Adamsky, Dmitry. “From Moscow with Coercion: Russian Deterrence Theory and Strategic Culture”. Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 1-2 (2017): 33-60.

Antoshin, A.V. “Russia Abroad After the Second World War: In Search of A Consolidating Idea”. Russia and the Contemporary World, no. 1 (2021): 20-30.

Daskalov, Krassen. “Hybrid Warfare and the Challenge it Poses to the Psychological Resilience Training In The Bulgarian Military”. Information & Security: An International Journal 39, no. 3 (2018): 197-205.

Dylan, Huw. “SIS, Grigori Tokaev, and the London Controlling Section: New Perspectives On A Cold War Defector And Cold War Deception”. War In History 26, no. 4 (2018): 517-538.

Forrester, Rochelle. “The Application of Mathematics to Warfare – The Battle of Crecy, the Battle of Carrhae, Mongol Battle Tactics, the Battle of Fredericksburg, the Battle of Outpost Snipe and the Battle Of Medenine”. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020.

Heck, Timothy. “The 64th Army At Stalingrad 1942–43: A Day-By-Day Account of A Soviet Combined Arms Infantry Army During the Battle for Stalingrad”. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 32, no. 4 (2019): 595-597.

Ivanyuk, S. “To The History of Events in Ukraine in The Spring of 1709”. Slavianovedenie, no. 4 (2019): 15-23.

Kondrat, Andy. “The Unintended Consequences of Reframing Denial, Unrealistic Optimism, And Self-Deception”. The American Journal of Bioethics 18, no. 9 (2018): 36-37.

Leonczyk, S. “Polish Educational Care Centers in the USSR During the Second World War”. Modern History Of Russia 11, no. 2 (2021): 392-407.

Macknik, Stephen L., and Susana Martinez-Conde. “Battlefield Deceptions”. Scientific American Mind 28, no. 2 (2017): 18-19.

Nakao, Keisuke. “Denial Vs. Punishment: Strategies Shape War, But War Itself Affects Strategies”. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017.

error: Content is protected !!