Metrology Experiment With Measurement Tools Essay Example


Objectives and Scope

The purpose of the experiment concerned testing the efficacy of the measurement tools such as the Vernir caliper, a depth gauge, a micrometer, and a gauge in an uncertainty analysis. The scope of the investigation was restricted to the analysis of the measurement results.


The experiment was carried out by testing the equipment on fluidic valve end caps.


The Vernir Caliper tool provided the results accurate within one ten thousandth. The ruler allowed a measurement accurate within one thousandth. A micrometer provided results similar to those of a ruler, yet did not measure dimensions A, C, and E. The use of the depth gauge did not yield any results.


The experiment has shown that the Vernir Caliper tool allows for the most precise measurement of various items along with the ruler. The depth gauge returned zero results, while the micrometer showed minor discrepancies.


The goal of the experiment concerns identifying the efficacy of measurement tools. The latter include a Vernir caliper, a depth gauge, a micrometer, and a gauge. The bias error, which is predetermined by the offset in measurement, and a precision error, which is the difference between the measurement results and the actual value, may lead to misinterpreting the measurement results.

Experimental Setup and Procedures

A fluidic valve cap (Fig. 1, Fig. 2) was chosen as the object of the experiment.

Fluidic Valve End Cap.
Figure 1. Fluidic Valve End Cap.

Fluidic Valve End Cap.
Figure 2. Fluidic Valve End Cap.

First, the resolution of the tools was identified. Afterward, the tools were checked for the zero value, which is defined as the false reading that a measurement tool may display when the actual value equals zero [1].

Then, each instrument was used to measure dimensions A, B, C, D, and E three times. The measurement results were formatted as an Excel table. Dimensions A, C, and E could not be measured with either the depth gauge or the micrometer. Moreover, the depth gauge failed to measure any of the dimensions.

Results and Discussion

Scatter Plot: Vernir Caliper.
Figure 3. Scatter Plot: Vernir Caliper.

The measurement outcomes show that the tool in question displayed rather uneven results when the measurement of dimensions C and E occurred.

Scatter Plot: Ruler.
Figure 4. Scatter Plot: Ruler.

The plot above shows clearly that the ruler provides larger results than the Vernir caliper. In addition, the difference in the measurement outcomes for the same element of the fluidic valve end cap is the lowest for the Vernir caliper and the ruler. The plot indicates that the ruler has a bias error, as it does not match the measurements from other instruments, whereas the rest of the measurements retrieved generally match each other and the ones in the manual..

Scatter Plot: Depth Gauge.
Figure 5. Scatter Plot: Depth Gauge.

As the scatter plot below shows, the depth gauge did not read any of the dimensions. The given phenomenon points clearly to the fact that the gauge cannot be used as a trustworthy tool for measuring the dimensionsof an object, especially when the latter has uneven sides [2]..

Scatter Plot: Micrometer
Figure 6. Scatter Plot: Micrometer.

The micrometer also failed to deliver the measurement results for dimensions A, C, and E.

Mean Experimental Values.
Figure 7. Mean Experimental Values.

Table 1. Mean Experimental Values.

Tool Vernir Caliper Ruler Depth Gauge Micrometer
Mean 0,6629 0,675 0 2,220967

The table shows that the Vernir caliper has the highest mean. The micrometer, in its turn, has the highest standard error value, which means that the results provided by this measurement tool are not quite credible.

The data provided in the sets above seems to be correct. The data, however, does not match the example provided in the manual. Particularly, dimensions E and A have a value according to the experiment results, whereas the sample does not provide these values.


As the results of the analysis display, the Vernir caliper and the ruler can be deemed as the most efficient tools for measuring the dimensions of objects. The experiment has displayed that the two measurement tools specified above allow for the highest precision rates and have a comparatively low average.


  1. Braun, E. M., “Metrology,” Mechanical Methods and Measurements Laboratory Manual, 2012.
  2. Bewur, T., Metrology & Measurement, Tata McGraw-Hill, India, 2011.

Colombian Civil War And The Issue Of Political Economy


Colombian internal conflict is one of the most protracted civil wars in the world. After a few decades, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) had established its position as the most stable guerrilla group in Latin America with considerable resources to run its operations. To this end, the issue of political economy arises in a war system as actors compete for natural resources to fund their operations.

Rebel groups always prompted the escalating war crisis as they embarked on rent-seeking tendencies to cause more instability for their resource gains against the state. The guiding research question is how political economy can explain the protracted Colombian Civil War, specifically between the state and FARC. In this literature review, therefore, the focus is based on how the political economy can explain the protracted Colombian Civil War.

Literature Review

For several decades, political scientists and economists have focused on intrastate wars and as a result, much evidence is now available on the issue. In the period of the Cold War, intrastate wars were regarded as proxy conflicts supported by superpowers to advance or defend their key interests in various parts of the world (Richani, 2001). Richani (2001), a scholar who has widely studied conflicts, applied systems analysis to various intrastate wars in order to elucidate the political economy of some of the most protracted wars and their possible solutions. The systems analysis is widely applied in interstate conflicts globally. The definition of the political economy of a protracted civil war is based on two major elements:

  1. a wide range of political and economic resources acquired by players in the war,
  2. the importance of these acquired resources as shown by actions of players in influencing military activities, territories, incomes, and support.

In addition, the accumulated resources also influence how a state distributes its national wealth. Richani (2001) argues that the witnessed intensification of conflict in Colombia was associated with the crisis of the war system triggered by the fight for the exploitation of natural resources among the warring factions, the state, rebels, and paramilitaries.

It is observed that the conflict in Colombia could have been triggered by the skewed protection provided by the state, which only favored dominant members (Richani, 2001). Consequently, many peasants and popular groups allowed armed groups to emerge as providers of security. Richani (2001) claims that the origin of FARC can be traced to the 1930s and 1940s – the periods in which peasants fought to protect themselves from large landowners.

FARC was officially formed in 1964, and it has always focused on protecting farmers (Campesinos). In this sense, therefore, FARC was created because of the failure of the state to protect minorities, and it subsequently embarked on a rent-seeking mission for resources. The group, however, experienced major obstacles because wars were expensive. Previously, FARC and other rebels depended on local and foreign sources for funds.

Once the Cold War ended, foreign financiers were no longer dependable and, therefore, guerrillas wanted new sources of funds, specifically self-financing. Consequently, FARC has generally depended on its own resources generated from rents extracted for the protection of locals. FARC levied taxes based on incomes and commodities. The guerrilla’s taxes mainly came from local business executives, drug traffickers, cattle ranchers, owners of large parcels of land, and multinational firms among others. In addition, FARC engaged in kidnapping for ransoms. By collecting taxes, FARC offered protection, stable business environments, and policing. Rent-seeking practices led to a war system in Colombia.

In Colombia, the war system emerged because of the state’s failure to arbitrate and solve social issues, specifically land ownership (LeGrand, 2003). Opposing actors also succeeded in coming to terms with the escalating war and, thus, they ensured that the war continued to create a favorable political economy, which made the conflict extremely rewarding to their interests with regard to economic, cultural, political, and/or ideological. In this sense, a favorable political economy can only be realized when resources acquired by actors overshadow costs associated with wars. FARC had realized that it could not gain access to such assets through peaceful engagement.

Based on this observation, the concept of ‘greed or grievance’ was introduced in attempts to explain civil wars (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2005). Greed, according to Collier and Hoeffler (2000), is associated with economic motivations and opportunities to loot (loot seeking), and it is linked to more cases of conflicts than other factors, such as culture. Hence, resource wealth is responsible for triggering violence (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000).

On one hand, it is noted that grievances are merely excuses used by rebels to conceal and justify their greed. Empirically, Collier, and Hoeffler (2000) observe that most rebellions seem to be associated with the capture of resources, for instance, drugs in Colombia to finance rebels. On the contrary, Peceny and Durnan (2006) claim that ‘greed-driven’ rebellions of Collier and Hoeffler (2000) cannot thoroughly account for the character of the Colombian interstate war.

The greed-driven rebellion fails to explain the origin of the war, the enduring ideological vision of FARC, or its social base in specific sectors of rural areas of Colombia (Peceny & Durnan, 2006). In addition, it cannot explicitly demonstrate the unlikely relationship between the character of coca and FARC. Therefore, Peceny and Durnan (2006) argue that FARC grew stronger because of ‘lootable’ wealth, specifically coca.

The US anti-drug policies led to the dismantling of drug operations in the state-controlled territories, but not rebel-held regions where coca cultivation thrived. Ultimately, it led to increased narcotrafficking to generate more revenues and, therefore, resources that FARC used to modernize its armed forces and make it more professional through creating military schools and accessing overseas training. As such, it gained a tactical advantage over the state.

Still, from a political economy perspective, the FARC military strategy has been strategic in terms of presence and expansion. For instance, it expanded since the 1980s to departments and municipalities with huge economic resources, large farms, mining, oil, cattle ranches, and coffee (Richani, 2001; Ross, 2006). Further, FARC also occupied its traditional bases for a cocoa plantation. Notably, after this expansion strategy, FARC occupied all departments and gained access to vital areas, including middle to higher growth-oriented locations, municipalities, the Caribbean coast, and other areas with higher economic worth. Strikingly, FARC only concentrated on such regions for both economic and political reasons.

Politically, FARC wanted a large base of supporters from popular middle-sized cities, to assume modernization, and to appeal to others beyond rural setups while disputing state dominance. Rent extraction remained important for FARC to gain its political goals. Increased rent extraction allowed FARC to acquire more resources with regard to arms, personnel, command, control, and communication (Richani, 2001).

Rebels, state, and paramilitary groups are all involved in extraction and rent-seeking behaviors and, thus, compete for resources. In the 1980s, various paramilitary groups emerged at the local levels to cater to the needs of the local influential elites, who were heavily taxed by rebels and feared rebels’ growing power (Gutiérrez, 2008; Romero, 2000). While paramilitaries competed with all these actors, they related to the state in terms of dependency and autonomy for logistical support provided by armed forces. However, paramilitaries were more aggressive in their strategies relative to the state because of a lack of pressure, such as sanctions, to control their activities.

In many respects, the state government was weak, poorly equipped, lawless, and relied on poor social networks. As such, a protracted civil war could escalate as rebels and paramilitaries became more aggressive in their quests. Largely, the weakness of the state is attributed to intrastate conflict and its escalation. That is the failure of the state associated with a prolonged crisis of hegemony that created a vacuum, which rebels and paramilitary readily exploited to establish their authority mainly through coercion.


In war history, economic dynamics are extremely important to actors. Thus, an analysis of intrastate wars from a political economy viewpoint potentially enhances comprehension of major dynamics involved in civil wars. In addition, they are vital for actors and other stakeholders who are interested in conflict resolution and post-conflict peace processes. Therefore, the political economy of the Colombian Civil War should be considered as an important component of any initiatives aimed at ending the conflict. The validity of a political economy viewpoint is based on competition for protection rent among a weak state, paramilitaries, and rebels and improving extraction strategies to sustain the war as each actor aims for a more prominent national outlook and role.


Ballentine, K., & Nitzschke, H. (2005). The political economy of civil war and conflict transformation. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2000). Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars. Washington, D.C: The World Bank.

Gutiérrez, S. F. (2008). Telling the difference: guerrillas and paramilitaries in the Colombian War. Politics & Society, 36(1), 3‐34.

LeGrand, C. (2003). The Colombian crisis in historical perspective. Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 28(55‐56), 165‐209.

Peceny, M., & Durnan, M. (2006). The FARC’s best friend: U.S. antidrug policies and the deepening of Colombia’s civil war in the 1990s. Latin American Politics and Society, 48(2), 95-116.

Richani, N. (2001). The political economy of Colombia’s protracted civil war and the crisis of the war system. Journal of Conflict Studies, 21(2), 1.

Romero, M. (2000). Changing identities and contested settings: regional elites and the paramilitaries in Colombia. International Journal of Politics,Culture and Society, 14(1), 51-69.

Ross, M. L. (2006). A closer look at oil, diamonds, and civil war. Annual Review of Political Science, 9(1), 265-300.

Chapter 9 Of “Criminology Today” By Schmalleger

The chapter 9 “Social Conflict Theories” describes the following analytical perspectives on law and social order. The consensus perspective revolves around the statement that the majority of society members have the same assumptions on the right and the wrong, and people collaborate to achieve some greater good. The pluralistic perspective claims that various values and beliefs exist in most societies at the same time, and each separate social group has its own set of values, beliefs, and interests. According to the conflict perspective, conflicts can never be resolved since they are an essential part of social life, and social order rests on law, which is controlled by the powerful (Schmalleger, 2014, p. 216-219).

Radical criminology is a view, according to which the causes of crime originate in social conditions that give power to the wealthy rather than to the poor. Contemporary radical criminology is divided into structural and instrumental directions. The central tenets of the structural school are: laws and justice system maintain the existing balance of power; even the rich cannot disturb this balance; laws guarantee the safety of the capitalist system. The postulates of the instrumental school are: the wealthy control the poor through laws and justice; the legal system ensures the survival of the power balance (Schmalleger, 2014, p. 223). The shortcomings of radical criminology are: mixing personal and social problems; sentimentality toward criminals; seeing wealth as a result of luck rather than work; not understanding that crime is a result of multiple problems (Schmalleger, 2014, p. 226).

The chapter describes five new conflict perspectives. Left-realist criminology touches such issues as street crime, everyday victimization, and fear of crime. It includes radical and Marxist directions. It is criticized for being ideological rather that theoretical. Feminist criminology states that crime and its understanding by specialists in criminology are affected dramatically be sexism and the imbalance of power between genders in patriarchial society. Feminist criminology has variations within radical, Marxist, social, and postmodern feminism. Postmodernist criminology denies the ability of criminologists to provide an unbiased analysis of the problem of crime since their perception is shaped by sexist, classist, and racist assumptions. It assumes that all previous approaches to criminology failed to suggest reliable ideas for crime control. Peacemaking criminology makes a transition in the in the issue of crime control from how to stop crime to how to achieve peace in society and between citizens and criminal justice institutions. Convict criminology is a group of criminology writings created by former inmates and convicted offenders, who have earned a degree in criminology or are associated with those, who have a degree (Schmalleger, 2014, p. 227-237).

The crime-control implications of social conflict theories are the following: to make crime rates go down, it is necessary to perform social changes and alter the distribution of wealth in society. Marxist and peacemaking criminologies are extremes since they offer too radical changes. Other directions suggest more reasonable changes (Schmalleger, 2014, p. 237).

The differences between the consensus, pluralist, and conflict perspectives consist in the following. The consensus and pluralist perspectives concentrate on the problem of values and beliefs. While the former recognizes one set of them in a society, the latter sees multiple sets. Unlike these theories, the conflict perspective revolves around the distribution of power in society. To my opinion, the consensus perspective is too positive and unrealistic, whereas the conflict perspective is too narrow. The pluralist perspective describes the existing social order in the most accurate way, and for that reason it is the closest to my way of understanding society.


Schmalleger, F. (2014). Criminology today: An integrative introduction (7th ed.). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall.

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